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BOTTOMS III: VISITATION RESTRICTIONS AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
Joseph R. Price*
In 1994, national media attention focused on the Virginia case Bottoms
v. Bottoms, in which Kay Bottoms successfully fought to terminate her lesbi-
an daughter Sharon's custody of Sharon's son, Tyler. Although the Court of
Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court's award of custody to Kay Bot-
toms, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the appellate court and re-
turned custody to Tyler's grandmother. Sharon then sought modification of
the visitation and custody order, but the trial court denied her petition and
instead reduced and further restricted her visitation rights. In Bottoms III,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded for reconsideration. This Comment uses the Bottoms case as a
framework for analyzing state courts' approaches to determining homosexu-
al parents' custody and visitation rights. Two approaches have emerged: the
traditionalist approach, under which a trial court may consider a parent's
homosexuality as evidence of moral unfitness inherently contrary to the best
interests of the child, and the nexus approach, under which a homosexual-
parent's conduct, rather than status, is the pertinent consideration. The
Comment concludes with a recommendation that courts adopt the conduct-
focused nexus approach in order to afford homosexual parents a genuine
opportunity to receive objective judicial consideration in custody and visita-
tion contexts.
INTRODUCTION
Six-year-old Tyler Doustou no longer runs laughing through his
mother's Henrico, Virginia apartment. She doesn't tuck him into bed each
evening or kiss him goodnight. In fact, for more than four years, Sharon
Bottoms's longest visits with her son have been anxious hours spent sitting
opposite him in a Virginia courtroom. For more than two years, Sharon
fought to regain custody of her son from her mother, Kay Bottoms,, and
Kay's live-in companion, Tommy Conley, whom Sharon asserted sexually
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abused her more than eight hundred times.' In a highly publicized opinion,
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Sharon, "although devoted to her
son, refuses to subordinate her own desires and priorities to the child's wel-
fare,"2 and it ordered the reinstatement of the trial court's award of custody
to Kay.' Clearly focusing on Sharon's sexual orientation as the determina-
tive factor in its decision, the court noted that "[c]onduct inherent in lesbi-
anism is punishable as a Class 6 felony"4 and that the "'social
condemnation"' attached to lesbian relationships "will inevitably affect the
child's relationships with his 'peers and the community at large."' 5 In an
apparent effort to find additional factors warranting the change in custody,
the court cited other evidence that, in the absence of Sharon's sexual orien-
tation, undoubtedly would have been insufficient to permit denying a biolog-
ical parent custody under Virginia law.6
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) [hereinafter Bottoms I],
rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). Kay Bottoms eventually acknowledged that Sharon's
accusations of sexual abuse "were not altogether unfounded." Id. at 279.
2 Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995) [hereinafter Bottoms II].
The Court of Appeals is Virginia's intermediate court of appeals; its jurisdiction in-
cludes appeal by right for all domestic relations cases.
3 Id. at 109.
4 Id. at 108.
Id. (quoting Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985)).
6 The court noted that in addition to Bottoms's lesbian lifestyle, "[tihe mother has
difficulty controlling her temper and, out of frustration, has struck the child when it was
merely one year old with such force as to leave her fingerprints on his person." Id. The
court also found
proof in this case that the child has been harmed, at this young age, by the condi-
tions under which he lives when with the mother for any extended period. For
example, he has already demonstrated some disturbing traits. He uses vile lan-
guage. He screams, holds his breath until he turns purple, and becomes emotional-
ly upset when he must go to visit his mother.
Id.
Virginia's courts long have found that the parental rights of biological parents are
paramount, and it is well established in Virginia that for a third party to divest custody
from-a biological parent, the fitness of the biological parent must be rebutted before a
court can consider whether the third party would be a "more fit" parent. See Bottoms I,
444 S.E.2d at 280. "Even when the parental level of care may be marginally satisfacto-
ry, courts may not take custody of a child from his or her parents simply because a
third party may be willing and able to provide better care for the child." Id. (citing
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1973)).
Virginia's commitment to the fundamental right of biological parents to custody of
their children is sufficiently embedded in Virginia jurisprudence that Virginia's courts
have found that a biological parent could retain custody even where otherwise compel-
ling facts appeared sufficient to justify a change of custody. See Phillips v. Kiraly, 105
S.E.2d 855 (Va. 1958) (denying an uncle and an aunt custody even though the child's
father was irresponsible, created pornography in his home, and had been a peeping
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Despite this effort at judicial slight-of-hand, both the legal community
and the press readily identified the "Bottoms IF"'7 decision as another case in
which a court relied on a parent's sexual orientation to justify diminishing
the parent's parental rights.' Concerned that an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court could result in an unfavorable ruling and that the appellate
process would be a lengthy one,9 Sharon and her attorneys returned to the
local juvenile and domestic relations court in an unsuccessful attempt to
seek modification of the custody order based on a change in circum-
stances. 10
Subsequently, Sharon experienced difficulties in exercising the visitation
rights established by the trial court and reinstated by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Bottoms HI." The original visitation order provided for weekly
visitation with Tyler from 10 a.m. on Mondays until 6 p.m. on Tuesdays. 2
The order prohibited Sharon from bringing Tyler to the home she shared
with her lesbian partner, April Wade, and prohibited visitations in Wade's
presence. 3 Based on her continuing difficulties in exercising her visitation
tom); Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 244 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (denying a paternal
grandmother custody even though the child and her natural mother resided with the
child's stepfather, who had killed the child's natural father in the child's presence).
Throughout this Comment, the court of appeals's 1995 decision (444 S.E.2d 276)
will be referred to as "Bottoms I," the supreme court's 1995 overruling of the appellate
decision (457 S.E.2d 102) will be referred to as "Bottoms H," and the court of appeals's
1997 decision (1997 WL 421218) will be referred to as "Bottoms III." See supra notes
1 and 2 and infra note 11.
8 Legal scholars viewed the opinion as placing Virginia among those remaining
jurisdictions that permit a legal presumption that a gay or lesbian parent's mere status
as a homosexual is contrary to the best interests of his or her child. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW (forthcoming
1997) (manuscript at 804, on file with author).
Newsweek, discussing the increasing number of "out" homosexual parents, noted
that gay and lesbian "parents are haunted by such well-publicized legal cases as the
1995 Virginia Supreme Court ruling that Sharon Bottoms was an unfit parent because
she is a lesbian." Barbara Kantrowitz, Gay Families Come Out, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4,
1996, at 51, 56.
9 See Deborah Kelly, Bottoms, ACLU Ponder Move Denied at the State Supreme
Court 'Level: Should U.S. Appeal Be Next?, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, June 12,
1995, at Bi.
10 See Deborah Kelly, Lesbian May End Bid for Son, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Feb. 28, 1996, at Al. Among the changes in circumstance were Sharon's securing
steady employment and her efforts to provide a stable home, which included her com-
mitment to a long-term relationship with her partner. Id.
" See Bottoms H, 457 S.E.2d at 109 (reinstating the'trial court's order); Bottoms v.
Bottoms, No. 2157-96-2, 1997 WL 421218, at *1 (Va.'Ct. App. July 29, 1997),[here-
inafter Bottoms III].
12 See Bottoms I, 444 S.E.2d at 280; Kelly, supra note 9, at B1.
13 See Bottoms 1, 444 S.E.2d at 280. Wade noted that the restricted visitation re-
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rights, Sharon petitioned the juvenile and domestic relations court for Ty-
ler's custody and an order requiring Kay to show cause why she should not
be held in contempt for her repeated violations of the visitation order. 14 In
response, Kay petitioned the court for further reduction or termination of
Sharon's visitation rights. 5
Following an ore tenus hearing, the juvenile and domestic relations court
dismissed the show cause motion and denied both Sharon's and Kay's peti-
tions for modification of the original visitation order.'6 Sharon appealed to
the circuit court and again appeared before Judge Buford M. Parsons, who
originally took custody of Tyler from Sharon because of her "illegal...
[and] immoral" lifestyle. 7 Despite testimony from a psychologist who had
examined Tyler, Sharon, and Wade and had determined that Tyler needed to
spend more time with his mother and Wade," Judge Parsons rejected the
petition and instead further restricted Sharon's visitation rights.'
Judge Parsons's new order limited Sharon's visitation to every other
weekend and one weekend during the summer.2' Judge Parsons specified
that "visitation shall occur outside of the presence of April Wade, it being
expressly provided that Sharon Bottoms will permit no contact between
Tyler and April Wade in any manner, including verbal contact."'" The or-
der also required that Sharon's visitations occur only at Sharon's home.2
Judge Parsons's decision to restrict visits to Sharon's residence reportedly
was based on his learning that Sharon had taken Tyler to the homes of les-
bian friends during visitations.' In adding the additional restrictions to
Sharon's visitation, Judge Parsons declared that he was bound by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's opinion in Roe v. Roe,' in which the court di-
vested a homosexual father of custody of his biological child and awarded
quired that "I have to leave my own house when Tyler comes to visit." Amanda
Bloodgood, Bottoms Back in Court: Appeal for Increased Visitation, OUR OWN, June
1997, at 1.
14 Bottoms III, 1997 WL 421218, at *1.
15 See id.
16 See id.
11 See Bottoms I, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
1 See Bloodgood, supra note 13, at 16.




3 Bloodgood, supra note 13, at 16. Because the trial court's original visitation order
prohibited Sharon from bringing Tyler to the home she shares with Wade, she brought
Tyler t6 friends' homes for the'visits. After Judge Parsons learned that those friends are
lesbians, he modified the order to prohibit visitation at any location other than Sharon's
home. Id.
2 See Bottoms III, 1997 WL 421218, at *2 (citing Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691
(1985)).
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custody to the child's mother. 5 Sharon appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals of Virginia. Holding that Judge Parsons had incorrectly inter-
preted Roe as "requir[ing] a disposition based solely upon [Sharon's] sexual
status, ' the court reversed and remanded.27
This Comment addresses the implications of the court of appeals's re-
cent decision in Bottoms 111 for lesbian and gay parents seeking visitation
with their children. It concludes that Bottoms III fails to impose any mean-
ingful limitation on a Virginia trial judge's ability to consider her beliefs
about homosexuality in determining the best interests of a child and that the
decision thereby continues the train of Virginia case law that permits custo-
dy determinations involving gay and lesbian parents to be made on the basis
of third-party prejudices and stereotypes rather than on evidence regarding
the actual impact of the parent's sexual conduct on his or her child's wel-
fare.
I. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CUSTODY AND VISITATION
DETERMINATIONS
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in custody and visita-
tion battles was routine during early attempts by gay and lesbian parents to
assert their parental rights.29 Courts generally viewed a parent's sexual ori-
entation as strongly mitigating against custody, and many jurisdictions
adopted a per se rule that homosexuality disqualified a parent from having
any form of custody.30 Introduction of the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard in the 1970s placed less emphasis on the parent's sexual orientation
and more emphasis on the child's physical and emotional needs.3 Never-
theless, the majority of courts continued to view a child's exposure to a
parent's homosexuality as detrimental to the child's best interests.32 Courts
also generally accepted that societal attitudes concerning the "immoral life-
style" of a child's parent would detrimentally impact the child's welfare.33
Consequently, while espousing a "best interests" standard of review, courts
continued to deny custody and visitation rights by finding that the immoral
nature of homosexual parents' lifestyle was presumptively contrary to the
" Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693-94.
26 Bottoms III, 1997 WL 421218, at *3.
27 Id.
2 See supra notes 7 and 14.
29 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 799.
30 Id.; see, e.g., Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Ct. App. 1959); Bennett
v. Clemens, 196 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1973); Commonwealth v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1952).
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best interests of their children. 4
Beginning in the 1980s, a substantial increase occurred in the number of
openly gay and lesbian parents seeking custody and visitation with their
biological children.35 Accompanying this rise in homosexual parents' asser-
tion of their parental rights was a proliferation in the publication of scholar-
ly research finding no developmental difference between children with ho-
mosexual parents and children with heterosexual parents.36 Such studies
also revealed that children were not adversely affected by growing up in a
gay or lesbian household.37 Based on her 1992 analysis of studies of gay
and lesbian parenting, University of Virginia Professor Charlotte Patterson
concluded:
There is no evidence to suggest that psychosocial develop-
ment among children of gay men or lesbians is compromised
in any respect to that among offspring of heterosexual par-
ents. Despite long-standing legal presumptions against gay
and lesbian parents in many states, despite dire predictions
about their children based on well-known theories of psycho-
Id.; see also S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); In re B., 380 N.Y.S.2d
848 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of
Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1297 (1981) (citing Hall
v. Hall, 291 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Di Stefano v. Di Stefano, 401
N.Y.S.2d 636 (App. Div. 1978)).
Such was the case in the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Bottoms 11. Not-
ing this, the dissent in Bottoms 11 criticized the majority's participation in this form of
discrimination:
Although there is no evidence in this record showing that the mother's homosexu-
al conduct is harmful to the child, the majority improperly presumes that its own
perception of societal opinion and the mother's homosexual conduct are germane
to the issue whether the mother is an unfit parent. Thus, the majority commits the
same error as the trial court by attaching importance to factors not shown by the
evidence to have an adverse effect on the child.
Bottoms II, 457 S.E.2d at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
35 APRIL MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING HANDBOOK: CREATING AND
RAISING OUR FAMILIES 162 (1993).
36 See David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific
Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 345, 355 (1994); Richard Green, The Best In-
terests of the Child with a Lesbian Mother, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7,
9 (1982); Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to
Social Science Research, 1 LAw & SEXUALITY 133, 156 (1991); Sharon L. Huggins, A
Comparative Study of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children of Divorced Lesbian Mothers
and Divorced Heterosexual Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 123, 132
(Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay
Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1992).
" See sources cited supra note 36.
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social development, and despite the accumulation of a sub-
stantial body of research investigating these issues, not a
single study has found children of gay and lesbian parents to
be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to chil-
dren of heterosexual parents. Indeed, the evidence to date
suggests that home environments provided by gay and lesbi-
an parents are as likely as those provided by heterosexual
parents to support and enable children's psychological
growth."
In conjunction with this new evidence and the growing number of cases
involving gay and lesbian parents, judicial treatment of gay and lesbian
domestic rights evolved, with the majority of jurisdictions adopting a nexus
approach to considering sexual orientation in the custody and visitation
context.3 In nexus jurisdictions, a parent's sexual orientation "is not per se
disqualifying in custody and visitation determinations, but it may justify
denying custody to a lesbian or gay parent if there is a nexus between the
sexual orientation and harm to the child."4 Recognizing parents' funda-
mental right to have and maintain a relationship with their children,4'
courts adopting the nexus approach have regularly held that a parent's ho-
mosexuality alone cannot be the basis for denying custody or visitation. 2
Although a majority of jurisdictions have adopted the nexus approach, a
number of states continue to embrace the traditional approach.13 Tradition-
alist courts hold that a parent's homosexual status, although not a per se bar
to a finding of fitness, is nevertheless a negative factor indicating moral
unfitness.44 Such jurisdictions weigh parents' "moral fitness" in their deter-
minations of custody and visitation and consequently routinely find that the
homosexual parents' "immoral lifestyle" warrants denying them custody and
38 Patterson, supra note 36, at 1036.
39 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 802-03.
o Id. (citing S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985); In re Marriage of
Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988); Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948
(Conn. 1988); In re Marriage of Wiarda, 505 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); Bezio
v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1992); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 503 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1986); Blew v.
Verta, 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 605 A.2d 1331 (Vt.
1992)); see cases cited infra note 48.
41 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
42 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 40.
43 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 804.
14 Id.; see White v. Thompson, 569 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1990); G.A. v. D.A., 745
S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
649
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restricting substantially their visitation rights.45
II. RESTRICTIONS ON VISITATION
The trend toward a neutral consideration of parents' sexual orientation
resulted in not only an increased likelihood that a gay or lesbian parent
could be granted custody or visitation but also that any grant of visitation
would be free of the numerous restrictions previously imposed on homosex-
ual parents' visitation rights. During the initial period in which homosexual
parents began to win visitation with their children, courts in almost all juris-
dictions routinely imposed substantial restrictions on the parents' visita-
tion. 6 Gay and lesbian parents were regularly prohibited from having over-
night visitation, were required to exercise their visitation rights outside of
the presence of their partner or any homosexual, and were often not permit-
ted to take their children to churches or other places accepting of their ho-
mosexuality.4 7
With the advent of the nexus approach, an increasing number of juris-
dictions began limiting the restrictions that could be placed on homosexual
parents' visitation rights.48 The same research underpinning reevaluation of
45 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 804; see cases cited supra note 44.
" See, e.g., Irish v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a
lesbian's children could not remain overnight at their mother's home if her partner Was
present); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that no female with
whom the lesbian mother was living could be present during the mother's visitation
with her children); In re J.S. & C., 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (per
curiam), aff'g 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (holding that a homosexual
father could not take his children to any homosexual-related activities or have his part-
ner present during visitation); In re B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that
a lesbian mother could not have overnight visitation with her daughter and could not
have her partner or other homosexuals present during visitation); Woodruff v. Wood-
ruff, 260 S.E.2d 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that a homosexual father could not
have his partner present during his son's overnight visitation but reversing the holding
that the father could not have overnight visitation with his son); Roberts v. Roberts, 489
N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the trial court's restriction on a homo-
sexual father's visitation that merely prohibited the presence of any unrelated male
during visitation was insufficient and remanding for consideration of additional restric-
tions).
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 46.
48 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that an affirmative showing of harm or likely harm to the child was necessary in order
to restrict parental visitation); In Interest of R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App.) (hold-
ing that a homosexual parent's "immoral conduct" might warrant limitations on contact
between the parent and the child but only if it is shown that the child is exposed to the
parent's undesirable conduct in such a way that it adversely has affected or likely would
affect the child), cert. denied, 472 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1996); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628
N.E.2d 633 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that the trial court erred in restricting a lesbian
650 [Vol. 5:2
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judicial treatment of sexual orientation in initial custody and visitation deter-
minations likewise was cause for courts to question the legitimacy of the
myriad of restrictions typically imposed on gay or lesbian parents' visitation
rights.49 Accordingly, courts began to reject the argument that a parent's
homosexual orientation alone could justify restricting the parent's visitation.
Instead, courts required proof of a nexus between the parent's homosexual
orientation and harm to the child to justify restricting visitation rights.5"
Under this standard, sexual orientation could be considered only to the ex-
tent that the parent's sexual conduct had a "direct adverse impact" on a
child's welfare and best interests.5'
The Court of Appeals of Ohio's 1987 decision in Conkel v. Conker2 is
illustrative. In Conkel, a mother appealed a court order granting overnight
visitation to the homosexual father of her two sons. The court of appeals
affirmed the order, rejecting the mother's argument that the father's status as
a homosexual warranted depriving him of overnight visitation with his chil-
dren and holding that "whether the issue is custody or visitation, before
depriving the sexually active parent of his crucial and fundamental right of
contact with his child, a court must find that the parent's conduct is having,
or is probably having, a harmful effect on the child.
53
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Washington struck down a trial
court's order permitting a homosexual father visitation only if he did not
allow his partner to reside in the father's home and provided that the two
men did not associate in any fashion that would suggest they were more
than "casual friends., 54 The court of appeals observed:
mother's visitation with her ten-year-old son to supervised visits on alternate weekends
with no overnight or extended visitation ); In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492
(Iowa 1990) (holding that the trial court improperly required that a homosexual father's
visitation occur outside of the presence of any unrelated adult); Conkel v. Conkel, 509
N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the trial court did not err in granting a
homosexual father overnight visitation with his sons because there was no evidence that
his homosexuality harmed the welfare of his children); In re Marriage of Ashling, 599
P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the trial court erred in requiring a lesbian
mother to exercise her visitation rights with her son outside of the presence of other
lesbians); In re Marriage of Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that because the evidence did not show that a homosexual father's display of affection
with his partner results in harm to his children's welfare, the trial court abused its dis-
cretion by conditioning his visitation with his children on the requirement that he not
display signs of affection with his partner in the children's presence).
9 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
50 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.
5' See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.
52 509 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
53 Id.
54 In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7, 7-8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
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Parents come in all shapes and sizes. It is a wonder of the
human race that, as a general proposition, children love their
parents and are better off with them than without them.
There are some restraints society places upon parents, of
course, but they are few in number and sexual preference is
not one of them.5
The court concluded that because "[t]here is no evidence in the record to
support a finding that the [unrestricted] visitation 'would endanger the
child's physical, mental, or emotional health," the restriction was impermis-
sible.56Although requiring proof of a direct adverse impact on a child's welfare
caused by a parent's sexual conduct prior to restricting visitation was a
relatively new development in cases involving homosexual parents, it was
not a novel approach. In a 1977 law review article, Professor Lauerman de-
scribed the "direct adverse impact" approach applied in Ohio and other
jurisdictions in custody and visitation cases involving allegations of inappro-
priate heterosexual sexual conduct by a parent:
In sum, the direct adverse impact approach to custody cases
involving parental nonmarital sexual conduct is the soundest,
provided certain limitations on its application are adopted.
Courts should consider only present impact. Before depriving
a sexually active parent of custody, courts should demand
preponderance proof that the parent's conduct is having or is
probably having an effect on the child and that the effect is
actually harmful. Without such proof, the fact of nonmarital
sexual conduct should not justify a custody denial or change.
Moreover, on the issue of harmfulness, the primary focus
should be on the child's present physical and psychological
welfare and developmental potential. Unless accompanied by
clearly adverse collateral consequences, moral impact should
be ignored.
Despite its general acceptance in most jurisdictions, traditionalist
51 Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
56 Id.
"' Nora Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L.
REV. 647, 681 (1977); see Inscoe v. lnscoe, No. 95 CA 12, 1997 WL 346199, at *10
(Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1997) (per curiam) (holding that "[a] parent's sexual orienta-
tion, standing alone, has no relevance to a decision concerning the allocation of parental
rights and responsibilities").
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jurisdictions have accepted the adverse impact approach in form only. Al-
though they espouse adherence to the proposition that a parent's homosexu-
ality does not render him or her per se unfit,5" traditionalist courts, whether
deciding custody or visitation, more readily find proof of "harm" resulting
from a parent's homosexuality than do nexuscourts. Unlike nexus courts,
which require that "harm" be proved by a showing of direct adverse im-
pact,59 traditionalist courts require no such showing and instead routinely
consider evidence deemed inappropriate under the nexus approach. Specifi-
cally, traditionalist courts regularly permit evidence concerning the "immo-
rality" of the parent's sexual orientation to play a substantial role in their
determination that the parent's homosexuality is contrary to the best interests
of the child.6'
Although nexus jurisdictions consistently require that homosexual par-
ents not expose their children to sexual conduct of any kind, they have re-
jected arguments that a homosexual parent's "immoral lifestyle" justifies
requiring parents to conceal entirely their sexual orientation from their chil-
dren.6 This approach adheres to the principle that the direct impact of a
parent's sexual conduct on his or her child is relevant to determinations of
parental rights but that the presumptions of a judge, party, or community re-
garding sexual orientation are not. To this end, nexus jurisdictions not only
have refused to consider allegations of the effect of a parent's "immoral life-
style," but they also have rejected arguments that homosexuals' children will
be stigmatized by a society that does not accept the parent's sexual orienta-
tion. An increasing number of nexus courts, citing the Supreme Court's
holding in Palmore v. Sidoti,6 2 have held that societal attitudes about a
parent's sexuality are irrelevant to determinations of whether a parent's
sexual orientation may harm the child's welfare.63
Not only do traditionalist courts permit consideration of the moral impli-
cations of a parent's conduct, but often they are required by statute to do
so.' This places gay and lesbian parents at the mercy of trial judges' per-
58 See, e.g., Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So.2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); S.E.G. v.
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Price v. Price, No. 02A01-9609-CH-
00228, 1997 WL 338588 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 1997); Katlas v. Katlas, 614 P.2d
641 (Utah 1980); Bottoms II, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
'9 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.
6o Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the
Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497 (1984); see, e.g., cases cited supra notes 44 and 48.
61 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.
62 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that it was error to remove a white child from the
custody of her mother, who was cohabiting with a black man, and to award custody to
the child's father on the grounds that the child would suffer social stigmatization be-
cause of her mother's interracial relationship).
63 ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 803.
6 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989) (permitting courts to consider parents'
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ceptions about the morality of homosexuality.
[J]udges, in assessing how a parent's sexual orientation af-
fects the child, often look beyond the evidence presented to
their personal assumptions about gays. Since these assump-
tions often lead judges to conclude that a child's relationship
with a gay parent is inherently damaging to the child, courts
in many jurisdictions consider it a proper exercise of their
discretion under the best interests standard to deem a
parent's homosexuality harmful even where no evidence of
adverse effect on the child exists. This amounts to a pre-
sumption that gay parents are unfit or that their fitness is
impaired. Depending upon the weight the judge assigns to
the presumption, it can be effectively irrebuttable. 5
Such was the case in the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Roe v.
Roe," in which the court concluded that a homosexual "father's continuous
exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship render[ed] him
an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.
67
Traditionalist jurisdictions also have found compelling arguments that
societal attitudes about homosexuality could result in the child of a gay or
lesbian parent being stigmatized or otherwise adversely affected. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia relied in part on such an argument in its decision in
Roe, in which it stated, "[W]e have no hesitancy in saying that the condi-
tions under which this child must live daily are not only unlawful but also
impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social condemnation
attached to them, which will inevitably afflict her relationships with her
peers and with the community at large.
68
Accordingly, because traditionalist courts are unconstrained in making
presumptions concerning the allegedly harmful nature of a homosexual
parent's "immoral lifestyle" and because they may rely on these presump-
tions instead of requiring evidence of actual harm, these courts are free to
"moral character" in determining custody); FL. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(t) (West 1985)
(requiring courts to consider "the moral fitness of the parents" in determining custody
and visitation rights); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (1989) (requiring courts to consider
parents' "demonstrated moral standards" in determining custody).
65 Bagnall et al., supra note 60, at 518-19 (footnotes omitted).
324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985)
67 Id. at 694. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting joint legal
and physical custody to the child's divorced parents, holding that the order was insuffi-
cient.because it merely "conditioned the father's custody upon his 'not sharing the same
bed or bedroom with any male lover or friend while the child is present in the home.'
Id. at 692.
68 Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
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impose almost any restriction on parental rights, provided the restriction is
premised on the need to protect the child from the parent's "deviant" life-
style. 69 The result is that although traditionalist courts aver that they do not
find homosexual parents per se unfit, they nevertheless do so implicitly by
presumptively determining that a homosexual orientation is immoral and by
considering societal attitudes that regard homosexuality as improper and
"deviant" behavior.
III. BOTTOMS III
Sharon Bottoms's experience is another example of the capricious nature
of justice when a trial court is permitted to consider its own presumptions in
lieu of actual evidence. The Court of Appeals of Virginia's decision in Bot-
toms III takes a step in the direction of limiting trial courts to the evidence
before them by rejecting the trial court's clearly erroneous holding that Roe
required finding that any exposure to April Wade would be per se contrary
to Tyler's best interests.70
Although the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
consideration of all "pertinent statutory factors," its decision nevertheless
falls short of imposing any meaningful restriction on the trial court's con-
sideration of its own or society's presumptions regarding the deleterious
nature of Sharon's lifestyle. Instead, the court of appeals merely recites the
Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Roe, in which it
expressly "declined to hold that every lesbian mother or
homosexual father is per se an unfit parent," noting that
"conduct[] in the child[]'s presence" and the attendant "im-
pact of [such] relationship upon [the] child" were the rele-
vant inquiries, not simply the sexual status of the parent or
parents. Mindful, however, that "'[t]he moral climate in
which children are to be raised"' warrants "'the most careful
consideration in a custody proceeding,"' the Court concluded
that, "[i]n the circumstances of this case," the "best interests
69 See, e.g., White v. Thompson, 569 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1990) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that a lesbian mother exercise her visita-
tion rights outside of the presence of her female partner); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the trial court erred in permitting a homosexual fa-
ther unsupervised ten-day visitation every other month with his daughter even though
the trial court required that the visitation be exercised outside of the presence of his
male partner); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the
children's best interests were served by prohibiting a lesbian mother from exercisifig her
visitation rights in the presence of any woman with whom she was living); cases cited
supra note 46.
70 Bottoms III, 1997 WL 421218, at *2-*3.
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.of the child" dictated divestiture of custody from the homo-
sexual father, subject' to a residual right of specifically limit-
ed visitation.71
The court of appeals also cited the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in
Bottoms II, noting that the court had reaffirmed its holding that a parent's
status as a homosexual did not render him or her, per se unfit but recogniz-
ing that the parent's homosexuality was "reflective of the 'home environ-
ment and moral climate,' an 'important consideration.' 7 2 The Bottoms III
court concluded:
Thus, both Code § 20-124.3 and controlling appellate deci-
sions clearly instruct that the parental rights of custody and
related visitation suitable to each instance must evolve from
a myriad of considerations, all calculated to exalt and pro-
mote the best interests of the child. While issues of adult
sexuality and related behavior are significant to an adjudica-
tion of visitation, such factors must be assessed by the court
together with other relevant circumstances and balanced in a
visitation arrangement which both benefits and protects the
child.7
Although it reiterated the finding that Sharon's status as a lesbian does
not render her per se unfit or require that she exercise visitation outside of
April Wade's presence, the Bottoms III decision clearly indicates that the
trial court can and should consider Sharon's sexual orientation in rendering
its decision. On remand, the trial court is free to conclude that exposure to
Sharon's "immoral lifestyle" would be contrary to Tyler's best interests.
Likewise, the court may determine that Sharon's decision to live an open
lesbian lifestyle or the likelihood of societal stigmatization necessitate re-
stricting her visitation with her son. Consequently, without holding that
Sharon's homosexuality requires a per se finding that she exercise visitation
out of the presence of any lesbian, the trial court may nevertheless reach
this result without proof that Sharon's actual conduct has harmed or is likely
to harm Tyler.
It is evident from the records established in Bottoms I and II that had
Sharon resided in a nexus jurisdiction, the restrictions the trial court im-
posed would be struck down as unsupported by any evidence. In Bottoms I,
the record established that although April and Sharon shared a bed, Tyler
71 Id. at *2 (quoting Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693-94) (alterations in original) (emphasis
omitted) (citations and footnote omitted).
7 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bottoms II, 457 S.E.2d at 107-08).
71 Id. at *3.
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had not slept in the room with them since he was an infant. 74 The record
also established that Sharon and April engaged in consensual sexual activity
in their home and had displayed some affection for one another by hugging
or kissing in front of Tyler, but that they "never engaged in any type of
sexual activity in [Tyler's] presence, nor ... exposed him to sexual conduct
of any type.",7' All psychological evidence introduced at trial indicated that
"Sharon Bottoms's open lesbian relationship has had no visible or discern-
able effect on her son.,
76
The following Illinois and Oregon decisions exemplify the many deci-
sions in which courts have considered facts similar to those present in Bot-
toms III and have found that restrictions like those imposed on Sharon Bot-
toms are unwarranted. 77 In Pleasant v. Pleasant,7 the Appellate, Court of
Illinois considered a lesbian mother's appeal of a trial court's order restrict-
ing her visitation with her six-year-old son Jimmie "by requiring that visita-
tion be supervised by heterosexual employees of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services, reducing her visitation to alternate weekends,
eliminating overnight visitation, and requiring that [the mother] enroll in
regular psychotherapy with no apparent goals for such therapy., 79 The
mother lived with her lesbian partner, and the trial court record indicated
that during unsupervised visitation, the son had seen his mother kiss and
hug her partner, had accompanied them to a hotel where the mother and her
partner stayed in one room and the son stayed in a connecting room, and
had gone -with them to a gay pride parade."0 The trial court found that
"having Jimmie in the- presence of gays and lesbians was endangering his
gender identity and morals and not in his best interests."'" The judge also
found that the mother's "inability to dissociate herself with known lesbians
during periods of visitation is not in the best interests of the minor child,
because it would seriously endanger the child's mental and moral well be-
ing."8 2
The Illinois appellate court found inadmissible the evidence that the
mother had kissed and hugged her partner because that evidence was re-
layed by the son, whom it judged incompetent to testify. The court noted,
however, that "[e]ven if the finding had been accurate,... respondent's
behavior would not seriously endanger Jimmie. There was no evidence that
there was any sexual conduct or other inappropriate conduct in Jimmie's
7 Bottoms 1, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
75 Id.
76 Id.
See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
78 628 N.E.2d 633 (11. App: Ct. 1993).
79 Id. at 634.
80 Id. at 636-37.
81 Id. at 638.
82 Id.
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presence."83 The court concluded, "The record indicates that there was no
evidence of any inappropriate behavior in Jimmie's presence. The fact that
respondent is openly involved in a lesbian relationship is not grounds to
restrict respondent's visitation with her son. Thus, we reverse ...."'
In the similar case of In re Marriage of Ashling,"5 the Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed a lower court's order restricting a lesbian mother's visita-
tion with her son "to such times and places that [the mother] does not have
with her, in her home, or around the children any [other] lesbians."86 Evi-
dence in Ashling established that the lesbian mother had sexual relations
with her partner in her bedroom while her children were in the house, but
never in the children's presence. The record also reflected that the mother
had demonstrated affection to other women while in the presence of her
children, although she stated that her actions were friendly or casual, not
sexual.8 The Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that this conduct did not
justify the restrictive provisions imposed, provided that "the mother's sexual
practices remain discreet-a requirement whatever the sexual preferences of
the parties might be."88
The facts presented in Bottoms are substantially similar to those in
Pleasant and Ashling. Both the Pleasant and Ashling decisions are legiti-
mate efforts by appellate courts to consider neutrally a parent's homosexual
orientation, to balance the possible effects of that orientation with the bene-
fits of maintaining the parent-child relationship, and to weigh the two in
considering the child's best interests. Both courts limited their determination
to the evidence established at trial and refrained from interjecting presump-
tions about the morality of the parents' sexual orientation. Both courts
focused on the need to insure that regardless of the parents' sexual orienta-
tion, the children were not exposed to sexual conduct.
Given the absence of any evidence of harm to Tyler's welfare directly
attributable to his mother's interactions with April Wade or other lesbians
while in his presence and the uncontested testimony of Sharon that she and
Wade would never expose Tyler to sexual conduct of any kind, it would
appear that Tyler's best interests could be served by a visitation order that
merely requires that Sharon and April refrain from any sexual activity in
Tyler's presence.
83 Id. at 642.
Id. at 635. The Illinois Appellate Court applied a statutorily prescribed "endan-
germent standard" in deciding the case instead of the "best interests" standard, id. at
640, but its finding regarding the harmfulness of the mother's conduct and the effect of
her conduct on her son nevertheless are apposite to Bottoms's situation.
85 599 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Because Virginia case law continues to permit trial courts essentially
unfettered discretion in making presumptions about the impact of a parent's
sexual orientation in determining a child's best interests, Sharon Bottoms
may fare no better in her next court appearance. Her circumstances make
plain that any equitable custody and visitation determinations for gay and
lesbian parents can occur only in courts that are required to decide cases on
the evidence before them, such as actual proof of direct harm resulting from
a parent's sexual conduct. The trial court's reconsideration of Bottoms's
case (and possibly an appeal of that decision) may yet provide Virginia with
the opportunity to remove gay and lesbian custody and visitation decisions
from the court of public opinion and to return them to a forum that requires
proof of direct harm. Until such time, however, it appears that Sharon
Bottoms's parental rights, like those of other homosexual parents in Virginia
and other traditionalist jurisdictions, will be determined not by her actions
but by her status.
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